Time Zones, Outsourcing and Patterns of International Trade by Toru Kikuchi




This paper proposes a three-country model of business services trade that captures the role of
time zones in the division of labor. The connectivity of business service sectors via
communications networks (e.g., the Internet) is found to determine the structure of
comparative advantage. That is, two countries with connected service sectors have a
comparative advantage in the good that requires business services. It is also shown that the
third country inevitably specializes in the good that does not require business services.
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A tremendous change is taking place in the world economy: globalization,
caused both by the communications revolution and by the deterioration of
barriers to international trade. It is now well recognized that there are many
kinds of trade, particularly in the business service sectors such as banking, en-
gineering, retailing, software development and so forth, which do not require
physical shipments of products.1 The rise of the Indian software industry
provides a prime example. The programming problems of some U.S. corpo-
rations are e-mailed to India at the end of the U.S. workday. Indian software
engineers work on them during their regular oﬃce hours and provide solu-
tions. By the time the oﬃces reopen in the U.S., the solutions have already
arrived, mainly as e-mail attachments. This type of trade in business services
requires two basic conditions: a diﬀerence in time zines between the trad-
ing partners and good connections via communications networks (e.g., the
development of the Internet).2 In other words, due to the communications
revolution, time zone diﬀerences may become a primary driving force behind
trade in business services.
In the existing literature on trade theory, however, relatively few attempts
have been made to address the theme of communications networks and the
role of time zones. In a seminal contribution, Marjit (2006) examines the role
of international time diﬀerences in a vertically integrated Ricardian frame-
work. However, the role of communications networks is downplayed in the
analyses. This study, in contrast, focuses on another important aspect: the
utilization of time diﬀerences via communications networks which allow busi-
ness service producers in one country to collaborate (or outsource) with those
in another country eﬃciently.3 The utilization of time diﬀerences plays a
1 Related to these phenomena, Cairncross (1997) wrote: ‘More dramatic than the eﬀect
of falling transport prices on tangible goods will be the eﬀect of falling communications
costs on those intangible processes and products that can be distributed on-line.... The
eﬀects will come ﬁrst in trade between businesses, such as data processing and business
software. (Cairncross 1997, pp. 214–215)’
2 See Marjit (2006) for discussion.
3 Harris (1998) explored the ability of communications networks to remove barriers to
1crucial role in economic activities in the world economy: if producers in one
country fail to exploit diﬀerences in time zones, they may be excluded from
the internationally connected network that is essential to certain types of
trade. In other words, the neglect of time diﬀerences might work as a trade
barrier for business services. The main purpose of this study is to illus-
trate, with a simple three-country model of monopolistic competition, how
the utilization of time diﬀerences can aﬀect the nature of trade patterns.
The next section presents the basic model. The nature of the trading
equilibrium is considered in Section 3, followed by concluding remarks in
Section 4.
2 The Model
In this model, there are three countries: Country 1, Country 2 and Country
3. Each country is endowed with L units of labor, which is the only primary
factor of production. The countries have identical technologies and the only
diﬀerences are in time zones. There is no overlap in working hours: when
Country 1’s workday ends, Country 2’s workday begins, and so on (See Figure
1). There are two consumption goods, Good X and Good Y . Both goods are
sold in perfectly competitive markets. Good Y is produced under constant
returns using only labor; units are chosen such that one unit of labor produces
one unit of output.
Good X is produced under constant returns using only diﬀerentiated
business services as inputs. The production and the unit cost functions for

















where n is the number of available business services, xi(pi) is the quantity
(price) of service i, and σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
the mobility of business services.
2between every pair of services.4 This production function has the property
that as input diﬀerentiation increases, productivity rises.
Business services are supplied by monopolistically competitive service
ﬁrms. Before starting production, α units of labor are required as a ﬁxed
cost of production. The central assumption is that each unit of a business
service requires production in two stages: the second stage must start after
the ﬁrst stage has been completed. Each stage requires one unit of labor.




i = α +2 xi,i =1 ,...,n, (3)
where superscript A denotes the case of a ‘communications autarky’ (i.e., no
outsourcing).
Given a Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation with constant elasticity σ, each service
ﬁrm sets its price as
p
A =2 σ/(σ − 1). (4)
With free entry and exit, the level of output that generates zero proﬁts is
given by
x
A =( α/2)(σ − 1). (5)
Alternatively, each ﬁrm can ‘outsource’ the second stage to the next coun-
try. In this case, each ﬁrm can complete its production earlier and reduce
working hours: it is assumed that 1+β (β<1) units of labor are required for
one unit of service. This captures the idea that specialization in order to take
advantage of time diﬀerences reduces marginal production costs.5 Although
we do not explicitly model the time aspect of production, this seems to be a
reasonable assumption.6
Another important assumption is that outsourcing requires communi-
cations between the outsourcing country and the insourcing country via a
4 This speciﬁcation follows that of Ethier (1982). See, also, Kikuchi (2003).
5 In what follows, we use ‘outsourcing’ and ‘the utilization of time diﬀerences’
interchangeably.
6 In an alternative approach, Marjit (2006) incorporated a rate of discount due to de-
layed product completion.
3communications network: each ﬁrm has to both send and receive its product
via a network. To get on the network, each service ﬁrm has to pay a ﬁxed
fee (γ).7 These assumptions are summarized in the following cost function:
TC
O
i = α + γ +( 1+β)xi,i =1 ,...,n, (6)
where superscript O denotes the case of ‘outsourcing.’ The costs of commu-
nicating across national borders can be oﬀset by a lower marginal production
cost.8
With outsourcing, each service ﬁrm sets its price as
p
O = [(2 − δ)σ]/(σ − 1), (7)
where δ ≡ (1−β) represents the reduction in marginal costs. With free entry
and exit, the level of output that generates zero proﬁts is given by
x
O =[ ( α + γ)/(2 − δ)](σ − 1). (8)
Now consider the supply function of Good X. Under communications










The curve SS, showing the above condition, is depicted in FIGURE 2(a).
Note that this curve is truncated because labor endowments limit the number
of service providers.










7 This implies (a) that there are aggregate constant returns in providing communications
services, and (b) that the pricing of communications services is done on an average-cost
basis. It may be natural to assume that the connection fee is a function of factors such
as the number of users, market structure and so forth (See Harris, 1998). In this study,
to make the model tractable, the assumptions about network technology are drastically
simpliﬁed.
8 Note that this correponds to Jones and Kierzkowski’s (1990) concept of
‘fragmentation.’











This indexcaptures important aspects of the utilization of time diﬀerences:
while the reduced prices of services due to outsourcing have a positive eﬀect,
the reduced range of services due to additional ﬁxed connection costs have
a negative eﬀect. The overall eﬀects are determined by the tension between
these two countervailing eﬀects. Now it is possible to state the important
conditions for outsourcing.
Proposition 1: If RC < 1 holds, it is more proﬁtable to outsource than to
maintain a communications autarky.
Before turning to the trading equilibrium, consider the situation in which
there is no trade in goods or business services (i.e., no outsourcing). In this
case, each country must produce all of the goods and services it will use,
which means that the price of Good X (P) must be equal to cost CA.O n
the demand side, it is assumed that the representative consumer has Cobb-
Douglas preferences over Good X and Good Y , with share coeﬃcients µ and
1− µ.T h u s ,PX = µL must be satisﬁed: the curve DD, showing the above
condition, is also depicted in FIGURE 2(a). Clearly the autarky equilibrium
without outsourcing occurs at point A.
3 A Trading Equilibrium with Outsourcing
In this section, three countries are assumed to open their goods markets.
Furthermore, the business service sectors in two countries (Country 1 and
Country 2) are assumed to be connected while the third country is not con-
nected. Let us call the former two countries ‘connected countries.’ These two
countries can take advantage of time diﬀerences. Assume also that RC < 1
holds.
FIGURE 2 demonstrates how outsourcing aﬀects the production struc-
ture of the world. FIGURE 2(a) shows the situation before outsourcing takes
5place, while 2(b) shows the situation afterward. The eﬀect of using time dif-
ference is shown by the change in the supply curve. The extended curve
S S  in FIGURE 2(b) reﬂects the enhanced division of labor between con-
nected countries, while the curve for the third country remains unchanged.
By taking into account a simple entry-exit process, connected counties will
specialize in both Good X and business services.
Proposition 2: Comparative advantage in Good X is held by connected
countries which can take advantage of time diﬀerences.
Let us consider this more closely. In connected countries, the network
provides opportunities for entry into the service sector because, with the
increased division of labor due to outsourcing, the average cost of Good X
becomes lower and the export of Good X is enhanced.9 Thus, the size of
connected countries’ business service sectors will expand, while the size of
the third country’s service sector will shrink. The point is that there will
be a cumulative process in which the increased connectivity via a network
will enhance exports, and exports will enhance further specialization in the
business service sector.
4 Concluding Remarks
This study highlights the role of time zones as a driving force behind trade.
It is shown that a comparative advantage in the good provided using business
services is held by the countries which are utilizing time diﬀerences and out-
sourcing (or insourcing) their production processes. Even more noteworthy
is ﬁnding that there is a circular causation between increased connectivity
via a network and trade creation.
9 This is shown as a movement in the direction of the arrow along the curve SS in
FIGURE 2(b).
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